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   Since	   the	  1960s,	  metaphysics	  has	   flourished	   in	  anglo-­‐American	  philosophy.	  Far	   from	  wanting	   to	   avoid	  metaphysics,	   philosophers	  have	  embraced	   it	   in	  droves.	  	  There	  have	  been	  critics,	  to	  be	  sure;	  but	  the	  criticisms	  have	  received	  answers	  and	  the	  enterprise	  has	  carried	  on.	  	   Matters	   have	   been	   different	   outside	   the	   so-­‐called	   “analytic”	   philosophical	  tradition,	  and	  particularly	  so	  in	  theology	  throughout	  the	  past	  century.	  	  Witness,	  for	  example,	  Kevin	  Hector’s	  recent	  book,	  Theology	  Without	  Metaphysics,	  which	  takes	  as	  a	  starting	  point	  the	  idea	  that	  metaphysics	  is	  a	  thing	  to	  be	  avoided,	  a	  succubus	  from	  whose	   embrace	   we	   must	   struggle	   to	   extricate	   ourselves.	   In	   the	   opening	   chapter,	  Hector	  writes:	  Modern	   thought	   has	   engaged	   in	   a	   recurrent	   rebellion	   against	  metaphysics….This	  recurrent	  rebellion	  against	  metaphysics	   indicates	  that	  although	  we	  moderns	  may	  want	  to	  avoid	  metaphysics,	  we	  have	  a	  hard	  time	  doing	  so.	  	  It	  would	  appear,	  in	  other	  words,	  that	  metaphysics	  is	  a	  kind	  of	  temptation:	  we	  want	  to	  resist	   it,	  but	  find	  it	  difficult	  to	  do	  so.	  (2;	  emphasis	  in	  original)	  As	  it	  arises	  in	  theology,	  the	  temptation	  toward	  metaphysics	  is	  supposed	  to	  have	  its	  origin	   in	   our	   natural	   propensity	   to	   speak	   positively	   and	   substantively	   about	   God.	  	  Cataphatic	   theology,	   so	   the	   reasoning	   goes,	   is	   inherently	   metaphysical.	   So	   our	  propensity	  to	  engage	  in	  it	  constitutes	  a	  temptation	  toward	  metaphysics.	  	  In	  turn,	  the	  concern	  about	  metaphysics	  is	  that	  it	  results	  in	  both	  idolatry	  and	  violence—idolatry	  because	   it	   shifts	   our	   attention	  away	   from	  God	  and	  onto	   a	   simulacrum	  of	   our	  own	  creation,	   and	  violence	  because	   it	   denies	   the	  otherness	  of	  God	  and	   forces	  God	   into	  creaturely	  categories.	  	  Would-­‐be	  theologians	  are	  thus	  offered	  a	  dilemma:	  	  apophatic	  theology	  on	  the	  one	  hand,	  idolatrous	  and	  violent	  theology	  on	  the	  other.	  	  	  	   In	   Theology	  Without	  Metaphysics,	   however,	   Hector	   seeks	   a	   middle	   ground.	  	  He	   offers	   a	   broadly	   Wittgensteinian	   theory	   about	   the	   nature	   and	   deployment	   of	  human	  concepts	  and	  predicates	  with	  the	  goal	  of	  showing	  how	  both	  can	  be	  applied	  to	  God	   in	   a	   non-­‐metaphysical	   way.	   In	   this	   way,	   he	   hopes	   to	   show	   that	   cataphatic	  theology	   is	   not	   inherently	   metaphysical,	   and	   that	   one	   can	   therefore	   engage	   in	   it	  without	  falling	  into	  idolatry	  or	  violence.	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   to	   Kevin	   Hector	   for	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   about	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   book	   and	   about	   some	   of	   the	  objections	   presented	   in	   this	   paper.	   Special	   thanks	   also	   to	   Matthew	   Halteman,	   Tamsin	   Jones,	   and	  Andrea	  White	  for	  their	  comments	  on	  portions	  of	  an	  earlier	  draft,	  for	  patiently	  talking	  with	  me	  about	  Heidegger,	  Levinas,	  and	  Marion,	  and	  for	  directing	  me	  to	  several	  very	  helpful	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   In	  what	  follows,	  I	  will	  argue	  that	  Hector	  has	  not	  succeeded	  in	  forging	  a	  path	  between	   the	  horns	  of	   the	  aforementioned	  dilemma.	   I	   shall	   begin	  by	  attempting	   to	  identify	  the	  proper	  target	  of	  the	  ‘idolatry’	  and	  ‘violence’	  objections	  and	  to	  provide	  a	  clear	   statement	   of	   each.	   I	  will	   then	   explain	  Hector’s	   proposal	   and	   show	   how	   it	   is	  supposed	   to	   provide	   a	   non-­‐metaphysical	   way	   of	   doing	   substantive,	   cataphatic	  theology.	   In	   the	   third	   and	   final	   section,	   I	   will	   highlight	   five	   difficulties	   that	   beset	  Hector’s	  view.	  	  	  	  
1. Objectionable	  Metaphysics	  Despite	  his	  provocative	  title,	  Hector	  is	  explicit	  about	  the	  fact	  that	  he	  does	  not	  mean	  to	  argue	  that	  theology	  can	  or	  should	  be	  done	  without	  metaphysics	  of	  any	  sort.	  Rather,	   his	   aim	   is	   simply	   show	   how	   theology	   can	   be	   done	   without	   falling	   into	  metaphysics	  of	  a	  particular	  objectionable	  sort.	  	  Just	  what	  sort	  is	  that?	  	  	  There	   are	   several	   ways	   in	   which	   one	   might	   distinguish	   metaphysics	   from	  other	   forms	   of	   theorizing.	   One	   might	   characterize	   it	   by	   its	   subject	   matter,	   its	  methods,	   its	   presuppositions,	   or	   some	   combination	   of	   these.	   Hector	   and	   his	  interlocutors	   (to	   some	   extent	   following	   Heidegger)	   seem	   to	   treat	   objectionable	  metaphysics	  as	  a	  mode	  of	  inquiry	  defined	  primarily	  by	  its	  guiding	  assumptions.	  	  Hector	   identifies	   objectionable	  metaphysics	  with	  what	   he	   calls	   essentialist-­‐
correspondentist	  metaphysics	  (‘ECM’	  for	  short).	  	  ECM,	  according	  to	  Hector,	  is	  	  …the	   attempt	   to	   secure	   human	   knowledge	   by	   identifying	   the	  fundamental	   reality	   of	   objects—their	   being	   as	   such—with	   our	   ideas	  about	   them.	   …	   [W]hat	   sets	   [it]	   apart	   [from	   other	   forms	   of	  metaphysics]	   is	   precisely	   an	   understanding	   of	   the	   being	   of	   beings—their	  essence—as	  that	  which	  must	  correspond	  to	  the	  ideas	  of	  a	  human	  knower.”	  (8)	  Note	   that	   it	   is	   one	   thing	   to	   say	   that	   the	   essences	   of	   material	   objects	   do	   or	   must	  
correspond	   to	   the	   ideas	   of	   human	   knowers,	   and	   quite	   another	   to	   identify	   those	  essences	   with	   human	   ideas.	   	   Since	   the	   ‘correspondence’	   requirement	   is	   plausibly	  entailed	   by	   the	   ‘identity’	   requirement,	   it	   is	   perhaps	   best	   to	   suppose	   that	   it	   is	   the	  correspondence	   requirement	   at	   which	   he	   intends	   to	   take	   aim.	   Doing	   so	   provides	  Hector	   with	   a	   more	   expansive	   target.	   Thus,	   we	   might	   say	   that	   objectionable	  metaphysics	   is	   just	   ECM,	   construed	   as	   the	   view	   that	   the	   being,	   or	   essence,	   of	   any	  object	  that	  falls	  within	  the	  purview	  of	  our	  theorizing	  corresponds	  (in	  some	  sense)	  to	  human	  ideas.	  I	   am	  not	   convinced,	   however,	   that	  ECM	   is	   the	  proper	   target	   of	   the	   idolatry	  and	  violence	  objections	  as	  Hector	  characterizes	  them;	  nor	  am	  I	  convinced	  that	  it	  is	  the	  characterization	  of	  metaphysics	  that	  those	  who	  raise	  such	  objections	  themselves	  have	  in	  mind.	  So	  I	  would	  like	  to	  suggest	  an	  alternative	  characterization.	  For	   Marion	   and	   Heidegger,	   both	   of	   whom	   loom	   large	   in	   Hector’s	   text,	  metaphysics	   involves	  putting	   the	   “being	  of	  beings”—i.e.,	   the	  being	  of	   things	   in	   the	  world,	   as	   opposed	   to	   God,	   or	   the	   ultimate	   ground	   of	   being—on	   a	   par	  with	   Being	  itself,	  and	  assuming	  that	  the	  latter	  grounds	  but	  can	  be	  accounted	  for	  or	  explained	  in	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terms	   of	   the	   former.1	  	   The	   idea	   that	   Being	   itself	   can	   be	   explained	   in	   terms	   of	   the	  “being	   of	   beings”	   amounts,	   in	   practice,	   to	   the	   supposition	   that	   human	   concepts—concepts	  shaped	  by	  the	  experience	  of	  beings	  in	  the	  empirical	  world—can	  be	  used	  to	  characterize	  God.2	  	  In	   a	   similar	   vein,	   Levinas,	   who	   does	   not	   feature	   prominently	   in	   Hector’s	  discussion,	   but	   who	   is	   nevertheless	   strongly	   associated	   with	   the	   idea	   that	  metaphysics	  is	  violent,3	  takes	  metaphysics	  to	  be	  the	  “promotion	  of	  the	  Same	  before	  the	  other,	  the	  reduction	  of	  the	  other	  to	  the	  Same”.	  (Kosky	  2001:	  9;	  cf.	  also	  Levinas	  2005:	  43,	  45	  –	  46.)	  The	  Same,	  for	  Levinas,	  is	  the	  thinking	  subject;	  so	  the	  idea	  here	  is	  that	   metaphysics	   presumes	   (objectionably)	   that	   the	   objects	   of	   our	   study	   are	  relevantly	   just	   like	   us—that	   they	   can	   be	   classified	   according	   to	   our	   own	   category	  system,	  understood	   in	   terms	  of	  our	  own	   familiar	  concepts	  acquired	  by	  way	  of	  our	  own	  perspectivally	  conditioned	  experience	  of	  the	  world.	  	  My	   own	   inclination,	   then,	   would	   be	   to	   characterize	   “objectionable	  metaphysics”	   as	   follows.	   To	   engage	   in	   objectionable	   metaphysics	   is	   to	   conduct	  inquiry	   in	   a	   kind	   of	   “self-­‐centered”	  mode,	   one	   which	   tacitly	   privileges	   one’s	   own	  conceptual	  scheme	  and	  cognitive	  capacities	  as	  the	  standard	  by	  which	  the	  world	  is	  to	  be	  understood.	  	  It	  is,	  in	  particular,	  to	  approach	  a	  phenomenon	  that	  we	  wish	  to	  study	  or	  understand	  as	   if	   the	   following	   three	  claims	  are	   true	  of	   it.	   	   First,	   it	   is	   a	  being	  or	  object	  like	  me	  and	  like	  other	  things	  with	  which	  I	  am	  acquainted.	  Second,	  it	  is	  similar	  enough	   to	   me	   and	   these	   other	   things	   to	   be	   understood	   in	   terms	   of	   the	   same	  fundamental	   categories	   (univocally	   applied).	   Third,	   to	   whatever	   extent	   I	   fail	   to	  understand	   it,	   the	   failure	   is	  not	  due	   to	  defects	  or	   limitations	   in	   such	  concepts	  as	   I	  have	   or	   could	   acquire	   by	   further	   experience	   but	   rather	   to	   my	   failure	   to	   have	   a	  sufficiently	   wide	   range	   of	   experiences	   to	   have	   the	   concepts	   I	   need	   in	   order	  adequately	  to	  grasp	  the	  phenomenon	  I	  am	  studying.	  	  (I	  will	  generally	  speak	  of	  these	  three	   claims	   as	   “presuppositions”	   involved	   in	   objectionable	  metaphysics,	   though	   I	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  1	  There	  are	  various	  technical	  senses	  of	  “world”	  in	  Heidegger,	  but	  I	  do	  not	  mean	  to	  invoke	  any	  of	  those	  here.	  	  (Cf.	  Heidegger	  1999,	  Part	  Two.)	  	  As	  to	  why	  metaphysics	  involves	  putting	  the	  being	  of	  beings	  on	  a	  par	  with	  Being	  and	  assuming	  that	  the	  latter	  can	  be	  explained	  in	  terms	  of	  the	  former,	  the	  reason	  in	  short	   is	   as	   follows:	  Metaphysics	   is	   concerned	   both	  with	   the	   “being	   of	   beings,”	   but	   also	  with	   their	  ground—the	   highest	   being,	   Being,	   which	   Heidegger	   identifies	   with	   the	   “god	   of	   philosophy”.	  (Heidegger	  2002:	  70	  -­‐	  72)	  But	  insofar	  as	  metaphysics	  seeks	  to	  “represent	  beings	  as	  such”,	  it	  does	  so	  “with	   an	   eye	   to	   their	  most	   universal	   traits”	   and	   “only	  with	   an	   eye	   to	   that	   aspect	   of	   them	   that	   has	  already	  manifested	  itself	   in	  being”.	  (Heidegger	  1998:	  287,	  88)	  Here	  then	  we	  may	  identify	  a	  guiding	  assumption:	  to	  investigate	  something	  in	  metaphysical	  mode	  is	  to	  do	  so	  under	  the	  supposition	  that	  its	  very	  essence	  can	  be	  understood	  in	  terms	  of	  universal	  characteristics	  that	  have	  been	  made	  manifest	  in	  
beings—i.e.,	   mundane	   things.	   But	   the	   ultimate	   ground,	   Being,	   is	   not	   a	  mundane	   thing;	   and	   so	   the	  supposition	  that	  it	  can	  be	  understood	  via	  concepts	  and	  categories	  crafted	  for	  understanding	  beings	  is	  suspect.	  	  Thus	  one	  finds	  Heidegger	  speaking	  of	  overcoming	  metaphysics,	  a	  goal	  that	  is	  accomplished	  just	  when	  one	  manages	  to	  “think	  the	  truth	  of	  Being”.	  (1998:	  279)	  	  Cf.	  also	  Marion	  1994.	  	  	  2On	   the	   relation	   between	  Being	   and	  God,	   see	   (e.g.)	  Heidegger	   2002,	   70	   -­‐	   72;	  Heidegger	   1998;	   and	  Marion	   1994.	   For	   both,	   Being	   understood	   metaphysically—the	   god	   of	   philosophy,	   or	   of	  ontotheology—is	   but	   an	   idol.	   But	   it	   is	   an	   idol	   often	   enough	   confused	   with	   God,	   which	   is	   the	  supposition	  that	  Being	  is	  characterizable	  via	  human	  concepts	  amounts	  in	  practice	  to	  the	  supposition	  that	  God	  is	  characterizable	  via	  human	  concepts.	  	  3	  But	  see	  note	  4	  below.	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do	  not	  really	  mean	  to	  suggest	  that	  they	  are	  always	  or	  even	  typically	  explicitly	  or	  self-­‐consciously	  assumed.)	   	  The	  violence	  and	  idolatry	  objections,	  as	  I	  understand	  them,	  apply	  most	   saliently	   to	   an	  approach	   toward	  God	  which	   treats	  God	  as	   just	   another	  object	  of	  inquiry	  to	  which	  human	  concepts	  can	  univocally	  be	  applied.	  	  Let	   us	   begin	   with	   the	   idolatry	   objection.	   Idolatry	   for	   Marion	   is	   not	   the	  creation	  or	  worship	  of	  religious	  idols.	  It	  is	  a	  broader	  concept.	  To	  fall	  into	  idolatry	  is	  to	  direct	  one’s	   thought	   toward	  a	   simulacrum	   of	   the	  phenomenon	  about	  which	  one	  aims	  to	  think	  or	  theorize	  rather	  than	  toward	  the	  phenomenon	  itself.	   	  This	  happens	  when	  one	  fails	  to	  allow	  things	  to	  “give	  themselves”	  in	  their	  own	  way,	  or	  to	  appear	  on	  their	  own	  terms,	  presuming	  (tacitly,	  via	  our	  intention	  to	  locate	  them	  within	  our	  own	  conceptual	   schemes)	   that	   they	   will	   appear	   only	   in	   ways	   that	   conform	   to	   our	  concepts.	  Hence	  Tamsin	  Jones’s	  characterization	  of	  idolatry	  in	  Marion:	  [Idolatry]	  is	  the	  constraining	  of	  any	  phenomenon	  within	  limits	  alien	  to	  the	   way	   it	   gives	   itself	   or	   shows	   itself.	   Defining	   the	   phenomenon	  according	   to	   one’s	   own	   subjective	   conceptual	   limitations	  is…idolatrous.	  	  	  (2011:	  9)	  	  Accordingly,	   Hector	   construes	   idolatry	   (of	   the	   relevant	   sort)	   to	   involve	   the	  subjection	  of	  God	  to	  human	  conditions	  for	  the	  experience	  of	  the	  divine;	  and	  he	  takes	  Marion	  to	  think	  that	  concepts	  are	  themselves	  a	  kind	  of	  “human	  condition”.	  (16)	  But	  if	   that	   is	   right,	   then	   it	   looks	   as	   if	   idolatry	  will	   be	   a	   danger	   anytime	  we	   take	   it	   for	  granted	   that	   God	   can	   be	   understood	   within	   the	   confines	   of	   human	   conceptual	  schemes.	   The	   proper	   target	   of	   the	   idolatry	   objection,	   then,	   is	   not	   ECM,	   but	   rather	  objectionable	   metaphysics	   I	   have	   construed	   it—most	   saliently	   (though	   not	  exclusively),	  the	  view	  that	  concepts	  apply	  to	  God.	  Now	  to	  the	  violence	  objection.	  	  Hector	  characterizes	  it	  in	  two	  separate	  places:	  once	   in	   discussing	   the	   work	   of	   Heidegger,	   and	   again	   in	   discussing	   the	   work	   of	  Caputo.	  	  As	  Hector	  understands	  Heidegger,	  the	  concern	  is	  that	  metaphysics	  (ECM	  in	  particular)	  	  ends	  up	  equating	  an	  object’s	  fundamental	  reality	  with	  that	  which	  fits	  within	   the	   bounds	   of	   [human]	   categories.	   The	   danger	   is	   obvious:	   	   if	  one	   thinks	   that	   one’s	   preconceived	   ideas	   correspond	   to	   an	   object’s	  fundamental	   reality,	   one	   may	   be	   tempted	   to	   force	   the	   object	   to	   fit	  one’s	   conception	   of	   it,	   whether	   because	   one	   fails	   to	   see	   anything	  beyond	   one’s	   conception	   or,	   worse,	   because	   one	   tries	   to	   make	   it	  conform	  to	  that	  conception.	  (11)	  Later,	  characterizing	  Caputo,	  he	  writes:	  Language	  is	  violent,	  according	  to	  Caputo,	  in	  as	  much	  as	  it	  seeks	  to	  fit	  objects	  within	  its	  horizon,	  to	  pin	  them	  down,	  and	  to	  hold	  them	  within	  its	   grasp.	   	   This	   being	   the	   case,	   Caputo	   reasons	   that	   ‘there	   really	   is	  nothing	  we	  can	  say	  about	  God	   that	   is	  not	  violent	   in	   the	  sense	   that	   it	  does	  not	   cast	  God	   in	   certain	   terms,	   that	   it	  does	  not	   subject	  God	   to	  a	  certain	  horizontality,	  and	  so	  set	  up	  something	  anterior	  to	  God,	  with	  a	  kind	  of	  ontological	  violence.’	  (20	  –	  21)	  (The	  notion	  of	  “ontological	  violence”	  in	  play	  is	  left	  unexplained	  in	  both	  Hector’s	  text	  and	   Caputo’s,	   but	   traces	   to	   Levinas.	   More	   on	   this	   below.)	   Thus,	   the	   core	   of	   the	  violence	   objection,	   as	   Hector	   sees	   it,	   is	   this:	   applying	   concepts	   to	   God	   is	   violent	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because	   it	   “cuts	  God	  down”	   to	   creaturely	   size,	   force-­‐fitting	  God	   into	   “antecedently	  defined”	  human	  categories.	  (49)	  	  	  The	   objection	   thus	   construed	   seems	   to	   depend	   on	   an	   understanding	   of	  concepts	   according	   to	   which	   nothing	   can	   strictly	   and	   literally	   satisfy	   a	   concept	   F	  unless	   it	   exactly	   resembles,	   with	   respect	   to	   its	   F-­‐ness,	   some	   other	   creature	   that	  strictly	  and	  literally	  satisfies	  F.	  (Cf.	  Hector	  2011:	  49	  -­‐	  50)	  One	  way,	  but	  not	  the	  only	  way,	  of	  motivating	   this	   idea	   is	   to	  suppose	   that	  concepts	  are	   just	  human	   ideas	   that	  arise	   out	   of	   experience,	   and	   that	   the	   extensions	   of	   concepts	   are	   classes	   of	   objects	  that	   exactly	   resemble	   in	   some	   particular	   respect	   other	   objects	   that	   lie	  within	   our	  experience.	  If	  this	  sort	  of	  view	  is	  right,	  then	  to	  say	  (for	  example)	  that	  God	  is	  wise	  is	  to	   say	   that	   God	   is	  at	  best	   paradigmatically	  wise	   in	   the	   creaturely	  way.	   It	   is	   surely	  hyperbolic	  to	  say	  that	  this	  violently	  “cuts	  God	  down”	  to	  creaturely	  size;	  but	  it	  is	  easy	  enough	  to	  see	  that	  it	  would	  at	  least	  result	  in	  a	  distorted	  vision	  of	  God.	  Thus	  far	  the	  violence	  objection,	  as	  Hector	  characterizes	  it.	  	  But	  I	  am	  not	  sure	  that	   this	   fully	   captures	   the	   fundamental	   worry	   that	   the	   objector’s	   have	   in	   mind.	  	  Here	   I	   think	   it	   is	   illuminating	   to	   consider	   the	   way	   in	   which	   Levinas	   (who	   is	   not	  among	   Hector’s	   primary	   interlocutors)	   associates	   metaphysics	   with	   violence.	   For	  Levinas,	   as	   we	   have	   seen,	   metaphysics	   is	   “the	   promotion	   of	   the	   Same	   before	   the	  other,	  the	  reduction	  of	  the	  other	  to	  the	  Same.”4	  	  It	  is,	  in	  other	  words,	  a	  tacit	  denial	  of	  the	  otherness	  of	  the	  other,	  a	  failure	  to	  allow	  the	  other	  to	  “appear”	  on	  his/her/its	  own	  terms.	  	  In	  less	  colorful	  and	  evocative	  language:	  one	  is	  engaged	  in	  metaphysics	  to	  the	  extent	  that	  one	  takes	  as	  a	  methodological	  starting	  point	  the	  idea	  that	  the	  others	  one	  encounters	   are	   similar	   enough	   to	   oneself	   that	   they	   can	   be	   accurately	   understood	  and	  characterized	  in	  terms	  of	  one’s	  own	  concepts	  and	  categories,	  without	  regard	  for	  the	   possibility	   that	   they	   might	   in	   fact	   transcend	   those	   categories	   or	   somehow	  otherwise	   elude	   characterization	  within	   one’s	   own	   familiar	   conceptual	   scheme.	   In	  doing	  this,	  one	  (conceptually	  speaking)	  forces	  the	  other	  into	  a	  pre-­‐cut	  mold;	  and	  this	  is	  where	  the	  association	  with	  violence	  comes	  in.	  Violence,	  for	  Levinas,	  “does	  not	  consist	  so	  much	  in	  injuring	  and	  annihilating	  persons	  as	  in	  interrupting	  their	  continuity,	  making	  them	  play	  roles	  in	  which	  they	  no	  longer	  recognize	  themselves,	  making	  them	  betray	  not	  only	  commitments	  but	   their	  own	  substance,	  making	  them	  carry	  out	  actions	  that	  will	  destroy	  every	  possibility	  for	  action.”	  (2005:	  21)	  	  One	  might,	  of	  course,	  challenge	  this	  characterization	  of	  violence;	  but,	  taking	  it	  as	  read,	  it	  becomes	  easy	  to	  see	  what	  the	  connection	  between	  violence	  and	  metaphysics	   is	   supposed	   to	  be.	   	   In	  metaphysics,	  one	  denies	   the	  alterity	  of	   the	  other;	  one	  “tries	  to	  integrate	  the	  other	  into	  [one’s]	  project	  of	  existing	  as	  a	  function,	  means,	   or	   meaning.”	   (Burggraeve	   1999:	   30)	   In	   so	   doing,	   one	   thereby	   risks	  “reduc[ing]	  the	  other	  to	  his	  countenance”,	  which,	  in	  turn,	  risks	  making	  the	  other	  to	  play	  a	  role	  in	  which	  she	  no	  longer	  recognizes	  herself.	  	  	  In	  this	  way,	  the	  “reduction	  of	  the	   other	   to	   the	   Same”	   amounts	   to	   an	   exercise	   of	   power	   over	   the	   other.	   As	  Burggraeve	  1999	  puts	  it:	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  4	  For	  purposes	  here,	  I	  conflate	  metaphysics	  and	  ontology.	  The	  distinction	  matters	  to	  Levinas	  (Levinas	  (2005:	   42ff);	   but	  what	   I	   am	   calling	  objectionable	  metaphysics	   is	   appropriately	   assimilated	   to	  what	  Levinas	  calls	  ontology	  (and	  to	  what	  I	  think	  even	  he	  would	  describe	  as	  objectionable	  metaphysics.	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In	  [reducing	  the	  other	  to	  myself]	  I	  approach	  the	  other	  not	  according	  to	  his	  otherness	  itself,	  but	  from	  a	  horizon	  or	  another	  totality…	  I	  look	  the	  individuality	   of	   the	   other,	   so	   to	   speak,	   up	   and	   down,	   forming	   a	  conception	   of	   him	   not	   as	   this-­‐individual-­‐here-­‐and-­‐now	   but	   only	  according	   to	   the	  generality	  of	  a	   type,	  an	  a	  priori	   idea,	  or	  an	  essence.	  …The	  ‘comprehending’	  I,	  or	  ego,	  negates	  the	  irreducible	  uniqueness	  of	  the	  other	  and	  tries	  to	  conceive	  of	  him	  in	  the	  same	  way	  as	  he	  does	  the	  owrld.	   	   Comprehensive	   knowledge	   is	   thus	   also	   no	   innocent	  phenomenon	  but	  a	  violent	  phenomenon	  of	  power.	  	  By	  my	  ‘penetrating	  insight’	   I	  gain	  not	  only	  access	   to	   the	  other,	  but	  also	  power	  over	  him.	  (36)	  These	  remarks	  apply	  all	   the	  more	  strongly	  when	  the	  relevant	  other	   is	  God,	  who	   is	  supposed	  to	  be	  radically	  other.	  Caputo	   seems	   to	   have	   something	   quite	   similar	   in	   mind.	   	   Consider,	   for	  example,	  the	  following	  excerpt	  from	  the	  same	  essay	  from	  which	  Hector	  draws:	  	   You	   see	   the	   idolatrous	   functioning	   of	   the	  metaphysical	   concept:	   the	  concept	   seizes	   God	   round	   about,	   measures	   the	   divine	   by	   humanly	  comprehensible	   standards,	   holds	   the	   look	   of	   the	  mind’s	   eye	   captive,	  and	   cuts	   off	   the	   infinite	   incomprehensible	   depths	   of	   God.	   	   Lacking	  infinite	  depths,	   the	  metaphysical	   look	  is	  accordingly	  not	  sent	  off	   into	  the	  distance	  but	  is	  reflected	  back	  onto	  itself.	   	  A	  metaphysical	  concept	  of	   God,	   let	   us	   say	   that	   of	   the	   causa	   sui,	   is	   an	   image	   of	   the	  metaphysician.	   	   It	   is	   not	   inspired	   but	   constructed,	   not	   infinite	   but	  finite,	  not	  an	  excess	  but	  an	  incision	  into	  the	  divine.	  (Caputo	  1992:132)	  The	   concern	   about	   idolatry	   is	   in	   the	   foreground;	   but	   Caputo’s	   broader	   concern	   is	  violence,	   and	   the	   key	   ideas	   in	   this	   passage	   resonate	   strongly	   with	   those	   in	   the	  quotations	  from	  Levinas	  and	  Burggraeve	  in	  the	  previous	  paragraph.	  	   Note,	   however,	   that	   the	   differences	   between	   these	   various	  ways	   of	   casting	  the	  objection	  pertain	  not	   to	   the	   target	   (which	   is,	   again,	   simply	   the	  presupposition	  that	  God	  can	  be	  understood	  in	  terms	  of	  human	  concepts)	  but	  rather	  in	  the	  reasons	  for	   thinking	   that	   metaphysics	   treats	   the	   objects	   of	   our	   theorizing	   violently.	  Moreover,	   it	   appears	   that	   the	   Levinasian	   reason	   for	   thinking	   that	   metaphysics	   is	  violent	  is	  quite	  similar	  to	  Marion’s	  reason	  for	  thinking	  that	  it	  is	  idolatrous.	  	  In	  both	  cases,	   the	   fundamental	   problem	   is	   that	   the	  metaphysical	   presupposition	   occludes	  the	  (perhaps	  quite	  radical)	  otherness	  of	  our	  objects	  of	  study.	  	   So	   the	   violence	   and	   idolatry	   objections,	   as	   I	   understand	   them,	   are	   mainly	  directed	  not	  at	  ECM	  but	  at	  objectionable	  metaphysics	  as	  I	  have	  characterized	  it;	  and	  they	  apply	  most	  saliently	  to	  the	  supposition	  that	  human	  concepts	  apply	  (univocally)	  to	  God.	   	  Assuming	   this	   is	  what	  puts	  us	  at	   risk	  of	   shifting	  our	  attention	  away	   from	  God	  and	  onto	  a	  simulacrum,	  it	  is	  what	  most	  clearly	  manifests	  our	  tacit	  denial	  of	  the	  radical	  otherness	  of	  God,	  and	  it	  is	  what	  constitutes	  our	  attempt	  to	  “force”	  God	  to	  fit	  human	  categories.	  Responding	   to	   the	   objections,	   then,	   will	   involve	   establishing	   each	   of	   the	  following	  theses:	  (1) Assuming	   that	   our	   concepts	   apply	   to	   God	   does	   not	   risk	   shifting	   our	  attention	  to	  a	  simulacrum.	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(2) Assuming	   that	   our	   concepts	   apply	   to	   God	   does	   not	   deny	   the	   radical	  otherness	  of	  God.	  (3) Assuming	  that	  our	  concepts	  apply	  to	  God	  does	  not	  “force”	  God	  to	  fit	  into	  human	  concepts	  and	  categories.	  Although	  Hector	  does	  not	  cast	  his	  project	  in	  these	  terms,	  his	  philosophy	  of	  language	  is	  crafted	  so	  as	  to	  guarantee	  each	  of	   these	  theses.	   	   In	  the	  next	  two	  sections,	   I	  shall	  summarize	  the	  main	  components	  of	  his	  view,	  and	  then	  highlight	  what	  I	  take	  to	  be	  its	  central	  problems.	  	  
2. Hector’s	  proposal	  Hector’s	   main	   goal	   is	   to	   show	   that	   language	   is	   non-­‐metaphysical	   in	   the	  following	   sense:	   	   concept	   application	   does	   not	   force	   objects	   into	   pre-­‐determined	  creaturely	  categories,	  nor	  does	   it	  presuppose	   that	  concepts	  express	  or	  correspond	  to	  the	  essences	  of	  the	  things	  that	  satisfy	  them.	  	  Key	  to	  accomplishing	  this	  goal	  is	  the	  deployment	   of	   a	   robust	   theory	   of	   concept	   use,	   meaning,	   reference,	   and	   truth-­‐evaluation.	   	  Here	   I	   shall	   focus	  primarily	   on	  what	  Hector	  has	   to	   say	   about	   concept	  use,	  but	  I	  shall	  begin	  by	  laying	  out	  the	  main	  components	  of	  the	  overall	  theory.	  Hector	  summarizes	  his	  philosophy	  of	  language	  helpfully	  as	  follows:	  I	  propose	  a[n]…	  account	  of	   language,	  according	  to	  which	  (a)	  to	  use	  a	  concept	  is	  to	  intend	  one’s	  usage	  as	  going	  on	  in	  the	  same	  way	  as	  certain	  precedents	   and	   to	   claim	   this	   same	   precedent	   status	   for	   one’s	   own	  usage;	   (b)	   the	   meaning	   of	   a	   concept	   is	   a	   product	   of	   the	   normative	  trajectory	  implicit	  in	  a	  series	  of	  such	  precedents,	  which	  entails	  that	  a	  concept’s	  meaning	  changes,	  if	  only	  slightly,	  each	  time	  a	  candidate	  use	  is	   recognized;	   (c)	   to	   refer	   to	   an	   object	   is	   to	   link	   up	  with	   a	   chain	   of	  precedents	   that	   carries	  on	   the	  normative	   commitment	   implicit	   in	  an	  initial	   picking-­‐out,	   in	   such	   a	   way	   that	   one	   inherits	   (and	   renders	  further	   inheritable)	   that	   commitment;	   and	   (d)	   to	   judge	   some	  proposition	  to	  be	  true	  is	  to	  see	  it	  as	  going	  on	  in	  the	  same	  way	  as	  one’s	  other	  commitments	  and	  to	  use	  it	  to	  judge	  still	  other	  propositions.	  	  One	  can	   thus	   arrive	   at	   an	   account	   of	   concepts	   that	   do	   not	   “contain,”	   of	  meaning	  without	  “meanings,”	  of	  reference	  without	  “presence,”	  and	  of	  truth	  without	   “correspondentism”.	   	  We	   arrive,	   in	   other	  words,	   at	   an	  account	  according	  to	  which	  language	  might	  be	  fit	  for	  God-­‐talk.	  (38)	  Note	  that,	  thus	  far,	  we	  have	  only	  	  the	  claim	  that	  language	  might	  be	  fit	  for	  God-­‐talk.	  To	  show	   that	   it	   is	   fit	   for	   God-­‐talk—that	   theology	   can	   be	   done	   without	   idolatry	   or	  violence—Hector	  adds	  a	  further	  component	  to	  his	  theory.	  	  This	  further	  component	  is	   a	   story	   about	   how	  ordinary	   concepts	   come	   to	   apply	   to	  God;	   and	   central	   to	   this	  story	  is	  a	  view	  about	  the	  work	  of	  the	  Holy	  Spirit.	  Drawing	  on	  the	  work	  of	  Schleiermacher,	  Hector	  develops	  a	  view	  according	  to	  which	   the	  Spirit	  of	  Christ	  works	   so	  as	   to	   shape	   the	  meanings	  of	  our	   concepts	   in	  a	  way	  that	  makes	  them	  applicable	  to	  God.	  	  The	  details	  of	  this	  theory	  are	  complex;	  but	  for	   present	   purposes	   the	   following	   rough	   summary	   should	   suffice.	   According	   to	  Hector,	   Jesus	   taught	   his	   disciples	   how	   to	   follow	   him;	   he	   also	   recognized	   them	   as	  competent	   at	   doing	   so	   and	   as	   competent	   judges	   of	  what	   counts	   as	   following	   him.	  They,	   in	   turn,	   did	   likewise	   for	   others,	   and	   so	   on	   down	   through	   the	   history	   of	   the	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Church.	  	  This	  is	  important	  because,	  by	  virtue	  of	  his	  own	  divinity,	  Christ	  himself	  faced	  no	  problem	  in	  applying	  concepts	  to	  God;	  he	  was	  able	  to	  ensure	  that	  the	  “normative	  trajectories”	   implicit	   in	  his	  own	  use	  of	   the	  concepts	  he	  applied	   to	  God	  had	  God	  as	  their	   “fulfillment”.	   	   (Whatever	   else	   it	   might	   imply,	   having	   God	   as	   the	   “normative	  fulfillment”	   of	   a	   concept	   guarantees	   that	   the	   concept	   is	   applicable	   to	   God.)	  	  Furthermore,	  Hector	  thinks,	  learning	  to	  follow	  Christ	  is,	  in	  part,	  a	  matter	  of	  learning	  what	  it	  is	  to	  “go	  on	  in	  the	  same	  way	  as	  Christ”	  in	  one’s	  own	  God-­‐talk.	  	  Learning	  to	  “go	  on	   in	   the	   same	  way”	   as	   someone	   in	   one’s	   own	   use	   of	   concepts,	   in	   turn,	   involves	  becoming	   attuned	   to	   the	   normative	   trajectories	   implicit	   in	   the	   ways	   the	   other	  person	  uses	  her	  concepts.	  	  It	  is	  this	  sort	  of	  attunement	  that,	  with	  the	  aid	  of	  the	  Holy	  Spirit,	   has	   been	   passed	   down	   by	   and	   through	   the	   Church	   so	   that	  we	   twenty-­‐first	  century	  theologians	  can	  go	  on	  in	  the	  same	  way	  as	  Christ	  and	  can	  reliably	  recognize	  others	   as	   doing	   so.	   Thus,	   Christ’s	   own	   ways	   of	   using	   concepts	   are	   among	   the	  normatively	   authoritative	   precedent	   uses	   for	   our	   own,	   and	   they	   are	   linked	   to	   our	  own	  God-­‐talk	  via	  a	  chain	  of	  further	  precedents,	  all	  of	  which	  go	  on	  in	  the	  same	  way	  as	  Christ’s.	  	  So,	  in	  short,	  we	  can	  apply	  concepts	  to	  God	  because	  Christ’s	  concepts	  applied	  to	  God,	  and	  at	  least	  some	  of	  the	  concepts	  that	  we	  apply	  to	  God	  are	  continuous	  with	  Christ’s.	   	  This	  does	  not	  tell	  us	  just	  how	  many	  of	  our	  concepts	  apply	  to	  God;	  and,	  as	  we	  shall	  see,	  real	  skeptical	  monsters	  lurk	  in	  the	  neighborhood.	  	  But	  I	  shall	  leave	  that	  concern	  to	  be	  developed	  later.	  	   The	   question	   now	   is	   why	   exactly	   this	   view	   allows	   us	   to	   say	   that	   concepts	  apply	   to	   God	  without	   falling	   prey	   to	   the	   idolatry	   and	   violence	   objections	   as	   they	  were	  characterized	  earlier.	  Hector	  takes	  the	  answer	  to	  lie	  in	  part	  (b)	  of	  the	  executive	  summary	  of	  his	  position	  reproduced	  earlier:	  (b)	   The	   meaning	   of	   a	   concept	   is	   a	   product	   of	   the	   normative	  trajectory	  implicit	  in	  a	  series	  of	  such	  precedents,	  which	  entails	  
that	   a	   concept’s	  meaning	   changes,	   if	   only	   slightly,	   each	   time	   a	  
candidate	  use	  is	  recognized.	  One	  might	  question	  the	  entailment	  claim:	  	  is	  it	  really	  impossible	  for	  there	  to	  be,	  over	  time,	  a	  perfectly	  stable	  normative	  trajectory	  in	  the	  usage	  of	  some	  concept?	  	  Has,	  for	  example,	  the	  meaning	  of	  the	  concept	  of	  pi	  changed	  in	  (say)	  the	  last	  twenty	  minutes	  as	   the	   concept	   has	   been	   introduced	   or	   employed	   in	   a	   myriad	   elementary	   school	  classrooms?	  	  But	  never	  mind	  this	  for	  now.	  	  What	  is	  important	  is	  just	  the	  claim	  that	  concept	  meaning	  does	  change	  over	  time	  with	  use;	  and	  that	  meaning	  is	  a	  function	  of	  the	   concept’s	   inherently	   unstable	   and	   therefore	   not	   entirely	   predictable	   normative	  
trajectory.	  The	  result	  is	  that	  concepts	  are	  open-­‐ended	  and	  vaguely	  bounded	  in	  their	  extensions.	   	   In	   other	   (perhaps	  more	   familiar)	   terms:	   	   concepts	   are	   vulnerable	   to	  semantic	   drift,	   so	   much	   so	   that	   it	   is	   indeterminate	   to	   what	   objects	   they	   might	  eventually	  apply.	  	  From	   this,	   then,	   it	   is	   supposed	   to	   follow	   that	   concepts	   do	   not	   necessarily	  correspond	   to	   fixed,	   unchanging	   essences	   of	   things.	   Nor	   do	   they	   necessarily	  correspond	   to	   or	   constitute	   “predetermined”	   or	   even	   well-­‐defined	   categories.	  	  According	  to	  Hector,	  …if	  a	  concept	   is	   the	  product	  of	  a	  series	  of	  precedent	  uses,	  and	   if	   this	  series	  changes	  every	  time	  a	  new	  use	  is	  recognized	  as	  carrying	  it	  on,	  it	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follows	   that	   concepts	   are	   continually	   being	   reconstituted.	   	   This	  means…that	  it	  makes	  no	  sense	  to	  talk	  about	  the	  meaning	  of	  a	  concept	  being	  fixed	  by	  its	  application	  to	  creaturely	  reality…	  (97)	  This	  is	  partly	  because	  it	  makes	  little	  sense	  to	  talk	  about	  “the	  meaning”	  of	  a	  concept,	  and	  partly	  because	  concept	  meanings	  are	  not	  fixed.	  Furthermore,	  it	  follows	  on	  this	  view	  that	  applying	  a	  concept	  to	  God	  does	  not	  imply	  that	  God	  exactly	  resembles	  any	  
creaturely	   paradigm;	   for,	   on	   this	   picture,	   the	   extension	   of	   a	   concept	   is	   not	  determined	   by	   anything	   like	   exact	   resemblance	   to	   paradigms.	   Thus,	   according	   to	  Hector,	   applying	   concepts	   to	   God	   no	   longer	   threatens	   to	   “cut	   God	   down	   to	   size”,	  forcing	  God	  into	  merely	  creaturely	  categories.	  Nor	  is	  it	  plausible	  to	  think	  of	  concept	  application	  on	  this	  view	  as	  contributing	  essences	  to	  things.	  After	  all,	  if	  what	  it	  means	  to	  say	  (e.g.)	  that	  God	  is	  wise	  might	  change	  over	  time,	  it	  is	  hard	  to	  see	  why	  one	  should	  think	  that	  calling	  God	  wise	  makes	  God	  into	  something	  that	   is	  essentially	  (and	  thus	  unchangeably)	   characterizable	   by	   the	   present	   content	   of	   the	   concept	   wisdom.	  Likewise,	  Hector	  might	  say,	  once	  we	  appreciate	  the	  fact	  that	  concepts	  work	  in	  this	  way,	   concept	   application	  does	   not	   even	   threaten	   to	   distort	   our	   vision	   of	   God;	   nor	  does	  it	  threaten	  to	  “make	  [God]	  to	  play	  a	  role	  in	  which	  [God]	  no	  longer	  recognizes	  [God-­‐self]”;	   nor	   does	   it	   “reduce	   [God]	   to	   [God’s]	   countenance”.	   For	   it	  will	   be	   built	  into	  the	  very	  idea	  of	  applying	  concepts	  to	  God	  that	  much	  is	  being	  left	  out	  and	  that	  the	   sands	   are	   always	   vulnerable	   to	   some	   shifting.	   Thus	   the	   violence	   objection	   is	  addressed.	  Nor	   does	   it	   “subject	   God	   to	   human	   conditions”.	   	   According	   to	   Hector,	   “the	  norms	   by	   which	   one	   assesses	   one’s	   [theological]	   concept	   use	   are	   not	   external	   to	  God—and	  neither	  are	  the	  concepts	  themselves.	  	  On	  the	  present	  account,	  one	  learns	  how	  to	  use	  theological	  concepts	  by	  submitting	  one’s	  performances	  to	  Christ,	  and	  one	  is	   able	   to	   submit	   them	   to	   Christ	   through	   the	   power	   of	   the	   Spirit.	   …	   One	  conceptualizes	   God	   through	   God,	   which	   is	   to	   say	   that	   one	   conceptualizes	   God	   by	  grace	  alone.”	  (96)	  This,	  then	  does	  away	  with	  the	  concern	  about	  idolatry.	  	  	  	  
3. Problems	  As	  noted	  earlier,	  there	  are	  further	  components	  to	  Hector’s	  overall	  theory	  that	  merit	  close	  attention	  and	  serious	  discussion.	   	  But	  I	  think	  that	  the	  material	  thus	  far	  presented	  provides	  a	  clear	  enough	  picture	  of	  where	  the	  view	  is	  going	  for	  us	  to	  see	  what	  sorts	  of	  problems	  it	  will	  face.	  	  In	  this	  section,	  I	  shall	  discuss	  five	  problems,	  each	  of	  which	  strikes	  me	  as	  rather	  serious.	  Let	   us	   begin	   by	   noting	   that	   one	   possibility	   not	   at	   all	   ruled	   out	   by	  Hector’s	  theory	   is	   that	   there	   are,	   after	   all,	   sharply	   bounded	   (non-­‐vague)	   properties	   which	  “correspond	  to”	  or	  serve	  as	   the	  content	  of	  our	  concepts,	  and	  that	   the	   instability	  of	  our	  concepts	  over	   time	  has	  simply	   to	  do	  with	   the	   fact	   that	  concepts	   take	  different	  properties	   as	   their	   precise	   contents	   at	   different	   times,	   depending	   on	   vagaries	   of	  usage.5	  Indeed,	  we	  might	  even	  suppose	  that	  there	  are	  determinable	  properties	  (like	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  5	  This	   general	   picture	   is	   built	   into	   the	   epistemic	   theory	   of	   vagueness,	   according	   to	   which	   the	  vagueness	  of	  a	  term	  or	  concept	  (like	  bald)	  is	  simply	  a	  result	  of	  our	  ignorance	  of	  the	  sharp	  boundaries	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being	  wise)	   that	   always	   serve	   as	   the	   ‘normative	   fulfillment’	   of	   the	   concepts	   (like	  ‘wisdom’)	  to	  which	  they	  correspond,	  but	  that	  the	  precise	  content	  of	  the	  concept	  at	  any	   given	   time	   is	   some	  determinate	   of	   the	   determinable	   (e.g.,	  Socratic	  wisdom,	   or	  
creaturely	  wisdom,	   or	   some	   other	  more	   specific	   sort	   of	  wisdom).	   	   On	   this	   picture,	  everything	   that	  Hector	   says	   about	  how	  concept	  meaning	  depends	  on	   “going	  on	   in	  the	   same	   way”	   as	   precedent	   uses,	   and	   about	   the	   instability	   of	   concept	   meaning,	  might	  still	  be	  true;	  but	  it	  will	  nonetheless	  be	  a	  picture	  according	  to	  which	  concepts,	  despite	  their	  instability,	  may	  still	  correspond	  to	  fixed	  properties,	  or	  categories.	  Now	  consider	  this	  fact	  in	  light	  of	  Hector’s	  stated	  goal	  of	  “free[ing]	  us	  from	  the	  metaphysical	   picture	   of	   concepts,	   according	   to	   which	   one’s	   use	   of	   a	   concept	  corresponds	  to	  an	  essence-­‐like	  idea	  or	  ‘meaning’	  and	  so	  [also]	  free[ing]	  us	  from	  the	  sense	  that	  concept	  use	  fits	  objects	  into	  pre-­‐determined	  categories.”	  (48)	  	  What	  is	  a	  
pre-­‐determined	   category?	   One	   answer	   is	   that	   it	   is	   nothing	   more	   or	   less	   than	   a	  sharply	   bounded	   property	   that	   objects	   might	   or	   might	   not	   objectively,	   mind-­‐independently	  exemplify.	   	  But	   if	   this	   is	  right,	   then	  by	  not	  ruling	  out	   the	  possibility	  described	   in	   the	   previous	   paragraph,	   Hector’s	   view	   fails	   to	   free	   us	   from	   the	  problematic	   “metaphysical	   picture	   of	   concepts.”	   Concepts	   will	   still	   correspond	   to	  determinate	  properties,	  and	  so,	  in	  applying	  them	  to	  objects,	  we	  will	  still	  be	  sorting	  things	   into	   pre-­‐determined	   categories.	   Note,	   too,	   that	   they	   will	   still	   be	  characterizable	   as	   familiar,	   human	   categories;	   for	   the	   properties	   to	   which	   our	  concepts	   correspond	   would,	   in	   order	   to	   secure	   the	   correspondence,	   have	   to	   be	  humanly	  graspable.	  	  	  	  	  Moreover,	   if	   pre-­‐determined	   categories	   are	   nothing	   other	   than	   mind-­‐independent,	   non-­‐vague	   properties,	   Hector’s	   talk	   of	   “freeing	   us”	   from	   the	  metaphysical	   picture	   of	   concepts	   does	   not	   make	   sense.	   For	   to	   say	   that	   objects	  
objectively	   and	   mind-­‐independently	   exemplify	   certain	   properties	   is,	   among	   other	  things,	   to	  say	   that	  human	  conceptual	  activity	  is	  not	  part	  of	  what	  makes	   it	   the	  case	  that	   they	   exemplify	   those	  properties.	   Thus,	   simply	  by	   virtue	  of	   believing	   in	  mind-­‐independent	  property	  exemplification	  we	  are	  already	  freed	  from	  a	  picture	  according	  to	  which	  human	  concept-­‐usage	   fits	  objects	   into	   predetermined	  categories.	   	  Objects	  either	   fit	   into	   those	   categories	   or	   not	   under	   their	   own	   steam,	   as	   it	   were.	   Human	  concept	  usage	  does	  not	  generate	   the	   facts	  about	  how	  objects	   fit	   into	   categories;	   it	  simply	  tries	  to	  represent	  those	  facts.	  	  Another	   alternative—and	   the	  more	   plausible	   one,	   in	   light	   of	  what	   has	   just	  been	  said—is	  that	  the	  predetermined	  categories	  that	  Hector	  has	  in	  mind	  are	  mind-­‐
dependent	   essences.	   Suppose,	   for	   example,	   that	   being	   a	   statue	   is	   not	   an	   objective	  property	  of	  a	  gold	  statue,	  but	  rather	  depends	  in	  some	  way	  upon	  our	  thinking	  of	  it	  as	  a	  statue	  rather	  than	  (say)	  as	  a	  mere	  lump	  of	  gold.	  	  Hector’s	  view,	  of	  course,	  implies	  that	  the	  concept	  ‘statue’	  might	  shift	  in	  meaning	  over	  time;	  so	  the	  view	  allows	  for	  the	  fact	   that	  what	  counts	  now	  as	  a	   statue	  might	  not	   count	   in	   the	   future	   (or	  might	  not	  have	  counted	  in	  the	  past)	  as	  such.	  	  But	  it	  doesn’t	  follow	  from	  this	  that	  applying	  the	  concept	   now	   to	   this	   particular	   piece	   of	   gold	   doesn’t	   fit	   the	   piece	   of	   gold	   into	   a	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  on	   the	   property	   to	   which	   it	   refers.	   For	   a	   thorough	   and	   classic	   defense	   of	   epistemicism,	   see	  	  Williamson	  1996.	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predetermined	  category.	  	  Indeed,	  on	  this	  picture,	  our	  thinking	  of	  the	  piece	  of	  gold	  as	  a	  statue	  (rather	  than	  a	  mere	  piece	  of	  gold)	  is	  part	  of	  what	  makes	  it	  a	  statue,	  and	  it	  is	  part	   of	   what	   gives	   the	   statue	   persistence	   conditions	   like	   being	   unable	   to	   survive	  
being	  recast	  in	  the	  shape	  of	  a	  cube	  that	  are	  not	  otherwise	  had	  by	  a	  mere	  piece	  of	  gold.	  	  So	  here	  too	  it	  seems	  that	  Hector’s	  theory	  of	  concepts	  fails	  to	  achieve	  his	  goals.	  	   Second	  problem:	  Suppose	  we	  grant	  that	  Hector’s	  theory	  succeeds	  at	  showing	  us	  how	  concepts	  (in	  general)	  can	  apply	  to	  God.	   	  Still,	   it	   is	  not	  clear	  that	  the	  theory	  shows	  us	  how	  ordinary	  concepts	  can	  apply	  to	  God.	  	  In	  showing	  how	  we	  can	  use	  his	  model	  to	  illuminate	  theological	  concept	  use,	  Hector	  writes:	  	   …one’s	   concepts	   are	   applied	   correctly	   to	   God…if	   they	   are	   faithful	   to	  God’s	  revelation	  in	  Christ,	  and	  they	  count	  as	  such	  if	  they	  go	  on	  in	  the	  same	   way	   as	   precedent	   applications	   which	   carry	   on	   the	   normative	  trajectory	   that	   stretches	   back	   to	   Christ.	   …	   To	   count	   as	   using	  (Christian)	   theological	   concepts…one’s	   use	   must	   be	   recognizable	   as	  trying	  to	  carry	  on	  the	  normative	  trajectory	  implicit	  in	  this	  chain	  [that	  stretches	  back	  to	  Christ].	  	  (95)	  This	   is	   all	   fair	   enough;	   but	   the	   thing	   to	   notice	   is	   that	   the	   criterion	   for	   the	   use	   of	  Christian	   theological	   concepts	   is	   not	   a	   criterion	   for	   the	   use	   of	   ordinary	   concepts.	  	  Thus,	   	   unless	   it	   can	   	   be	   shown	   that,	   	   as	   a	  matter	   of	   contingent	   historical	   fact	   the	  normative	  trajectory	  implicit	  in	  the	  use	  of	  some	  ordinary	  concept	  C	  is	  recognizably	  
identical	   to	   the	  normative	   trajectory	   implicit	   in	   some	  chain	  of	  precedent	  uses	   that	  stretches	   back	   to	   Christ,	   we	   have	   no	   reason	   for	   thinking	   that	   C	   is	   a	   ‘Christian	  theological	   concept’,	   and	   so	  no	   reason	   for	   thinking	   that	  C	  properly	  applies	   to	   (the	  Christian)	  God.6	  	  	  	   To	   illustrate,	   consider	   the	   concept	   ‘wisdom’	   as	   it	   is	  used	   in	   the	  predication	  ‘God	   is	   wise’.	   	   Suppose	   we	   grant	   that	   Christians	   who	   say	   that	   God	   is	   wise	   are	  recognizably	   trying	   to	   carry	   on	   a	   normative	   trajectory	   implicit	   in	   a	   chain	   of	  precedent	  uses	  of	  the	  term	  ‘wise’	  that	  stretches	  back	  to	  Christ.	  	  Suppose	  further	  that	  we	  grant	  that,	  by	  virtue	  of	  this,	  ‘wisdom’	  applies	  to	  God.	  	  Still,	  it	  does	  not	  follow	  that	  any	   ordinary	   concept	   applies	   to	   God;	   for	   it	   does	   not	   follow	   that	   the	   theological	  
concept	  ‘wisdom’	  is	  identical	  to	  (or	  even	  intelligibly	  related	  to)	  the	  ordinary	  concept	  that	  goes	  by	  the	  same	  name.	  	  To	  show	  that	  wisdomtheological	  =	  wisdomordinary,	  we	  would	  have	  to	  show	  what	  Hector	  has	  not:	  	  namely,	  that	  the	  normative	  trajectory	  implicit	  in	  non-­‐theological	   uses	   of	   the	   concept	   ‘wisdom’	   is	   recognizably	   the	   same	   as	   the	  normative	  trajectory	  implicit	  in	  the	  chain	  stretching	  back	  to	  Christ	  of	  precedent	  uses	  of	   the	   theological	   concept.	   I	   do	   not	   know	   how	   one	   could	   show	   this;	   but	   without	  showing	   this,	   it	   seem	   that	   Hector’s	   philosophy	   of	   language	   inadvertently	   gives	  victory	  to	  the	  apophatic	  theologians.	  Ordinary	  concepts	  do	  not	  apply	  to	  God.	  	  Rather,	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  6	  Note	  that	  the	  point	  here	  does	  not	  depend	  on	  interpreting	  “going	  on	  in	  the	  same	  way”	  as	  equivalent	  to	   “going	   on	   in	   the	   same	   identical	  way”.	   	  Hector	   has	   informed	  me	   (personal	   conversation)	   that	   he	  intends	  “same”	  in	  this	  context	  to	  be	  understood	  more	  with	  the	  sense	  of	  “similar”	  than	  with	  the	  sense	  of	  “identical”.	  	  Nevertheless,	  even	  granting	  this,	  it	  seems	  that	  the	  non-­‐theological	  concept	  of	  wisdom	  is	  identical	  to	  the	  theological	  concept	  of	  wisdom	  only	  if	  the	  normative	  trajectory	  of	  the	  one	  is	  identical	  to	  that	  of	  the	  other.	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we	  can	  speak	  of	  God	  only	  in	  a	  special	  theological	  language,	  employing	  concepts	  that,	  for	  all	  we	  can	  tell,	  may	  not	  even	  be	  intelligibly	  related	  to	  our	  ordinary	  ones.7	  	   Third	   problem:	   	   Thus	   far	   I	   have	   been	   assuming	   that	   Hector’s	   theory	   of	  concept	  usage	  is	  viable,	  at	  least	  in	  broad	  outline.	   	  But	  this	  too	  is	  questionable.	   	  For	  Hector,	  concept	  usage	  depends	  upon	  judgments	  to	  the	  effect	  that	  one	  concept	  is	  the	  same	   as	   another;	   it	   also	   depends	   upon	   the	   existence	   and	   recognition	   as	   such	   of	  precedent	  uses.	  Thus:	  	   To	  use	  a	  concept	  is	  to	  recognize	  the	  concept	  use	  of	  others	  as	  having	  a	  certain	   normative	   authority	   over	   one,	   and	   to	   claim	   this	   same	   status	  for	  one’s	  own	  use.	  	  To	  count	  as	  using	  a	  particular	  concept,	  one’s	  usage	  must	  be	  recognizable	  as	  using	  the	  same	  concept	  as	  others,	  which	  is	  to	  say	  that	  it	  must	  go	  on	  in	  the	  same	  way	  as	  uses	  that	  are	  recognized	  as	  precedential—that	  is,	  as	  uses	  of	  the	  concept	  in	  question.	  (62)	  But	   it	   is	  easy	  to	  see	  why	  the	  requirement	  that	  there	  be	  recognized	  precedent	  uses	  will	  pose	  a	  problem.	  Assuming	  one	  has	  to	  use	  a	  concept	  in	  order	  to	  introduce	  it,	  the	  requirement	   implies	   that	   concepts	   can	   never	   be	   introduced.	   It	   also	   implies	  (absurdly)	   that	   behind	   every	   instance	   of	   concept	   use	   is	   an	   infinite	   series	   of	  precedent	  uses	  (since	  any	  precedent	  use	  will	  count	  as	  the	  use	  of	  a	  concept	  only	  if	  it	  goes	  on	  in	  the	  same	  way	  as	  some	  precedent).	  	  Of	  course,	  one	  can	  fix	  this	  problem	  by	  stipulating	   that	   one	   can	   also	   use	   concepts	   without	   precedent	   at	   the	   moment	   of	  introduction.	   	  But	  then	  one	  faces	  a	  dilemma:	  either	  concept	   introduction	   is	  always	  violent	   (and	   theological	   concept	   introduction	   always	   idolatrous)	   or	   else	   Hector’s	  elaborate	  story	  about	  how	  concept-­‐use	  depends	  on	  normative-­‐trajectories	   implicit	  in	   chains	   of	   precedent	   uses	   is	   ultimately	   irrelevant	   to	   thwarting	   the	   idolatry	   and	  violence	  objections.	  	   But	   what	   of	   the	   claim	   that	   concept-­‐usage	   depends	   upon	   judgments	   to	   the	  effect	  that	  one	  concept	  is	  the	  same	  as	  another?	  	  Here	  we	  face	  a	  dilemma.	  	  Either	  the	  judgments	  must	  all	  be	  explicit,	  or	  not.	   	  Suppose	  they	  must	  all	  be	  explicit.	   	  Then	  we	  face	  a	  vicious	  regress.	  	  Why?	  	  Because	  making	  the	  judgment	  ‘A	  is	  the	  same	  concept	  as	  B’	   involves	   applying	   the	   concept	   ‘sameness’	   to	  A	  and	  B.	   	   In	  order	   to	   apply	   that	  concept	  to	  A	  and	  B,	  however,	  I	  have	  to	  judge	  that	  my	  concept	  ‘sameness’	  is	  the	  same	  concept	  as	  one	  involved	  in	  precedent	  applications	  of	  the	  term	  ‘sameness’.	  	  To	  make	  this	  judgment,	  however,	  I	  have	  to	  use	  the	  (or,	  better,	  a)	  sameness	  concept	  again;	  and	  to	  do	   that,	   I	  have	   to	   judge	   it	   to	  be	   the	  same	  as	  precedent	  uses,	   thus	  using	  another	  sameness	  concept,	  and	  so	  on.	  	   Better,	  then,	  to	  say	  that	  the	  judgments	  need	  not	  be	  explicit.	  	  And,	  indeed,	  this	  is	   what	   Hector	   does	   seem	   to	   say	   (pp.	   64ff).	   Hector	   speaks	   of	   the	   ‘implicit	  recognition’	  that	  one	  instance	  of	  concept	  usage	  goes	  on	  in	  the	  same	  way	  as	  others,	  and	  he	  also	  seems	  to	  want	  to	  allow	  that	  one	  can	  ‘implicitly	  try’	  to	  go	  on	  in	  the	  same	  way	  as	  others	  (which	  is	  good,	  because	  otherwise	  trying	  to	  go	  on	  in	  the	  same	  way	  as	  others	  would	  generate	  the	  same	  regress	  of	  concept	  application).	  (81	  –	  82)	  	  But	  now	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  7	  Note	   that	   semantic	   drift	   together	   with	   the	   bifurcation	   of	   Christendom	   into	   different	   theological	  communities	   means	   that	   we	   might	   not	   even	   be	   using	   the	   same	   theological	   concepts	   as	   other	  Christians.	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we	  face	  in	  spades	  the	  problem	  of	  determining	  when	  a	  person	  (or	  even	  we	  ourselves)	  intends	  to	  go	  on	  in	  the	  same	  way	  as	  someone	  else.	   	  Suppose	  I	  say	  that	  God	  is	  wise,	  but	  I	  am	  neither	  explicitly	  (i.e.,	  consciously)	  judging	  myself	  to	  go	  on	  in	  the	  same	  way	  as	  Christ	  nor	  explicitly	  intending	  to	  go	  on	  in	  the	  same	  way	  as	  Christ.	  	  We	  might	  ask	  
what	  makes	  it	  the	  case	  that	  I	  am	  doing	  these	  things.	  	  But	  even	  if	  we	  waive	  that	  worry,	  Hector’s	  conditions	  for	  concept-­‐usage	  require	  not	  only	  that	  I	  be	  doing	  them,	  but	  also	  that	  I	  be	  recognizably	  doing	  them.	  	  But	  if	  I	  have	  not	  even	  acknowledged	  to	  myself,	  so	  to	  speak,	  the	  relevant	  judgments	  or	  intentions,	  how	  could	  others	  recognize	  them	  in	  me?	  	  The	  cases	  where	  I	  am	  implicitly	  trying	  to	  go	  on	  in	  the	  same	  way	  as	  Christ	  might	  be	  indistinguishable	  in	  practice	  from	  the	  cases	  where	  I	  am	  implicitly	  trying	  to	  go	  on	  in	   the	   same	   way	   as	   someone	   else	   who	   is	   working	   with	   a	   subtly	   but	   genuinely	  different	  concept	  of	  wisdom.	  	   Fourth	   problem:	   	   According	   to	   Hector,	   a	   candidate	   performance	   counts	   as	  going	  on	  in	  the	  same	  way	  as	  precedent	  performances	  if	  and	  only	  if	  it	  is	  recognizable	  as	   such	   by	   those	   who	   know	   how	   to	   undertake	   such	   performances.	   (68)	   	   But	   we	  might	  well	  ask	  what	  ‘recognizable’	  means.	  	  If	  the	  idea	  is	  that	  one	  performance	  goes	  on	  in	  the	  same	  way	  as	  another	  if	  and	  only	  if	  someone	  who	  knows	  how	  to	  undertake	  such	  performances	  is	  capable	  of	  forming	  the	  belief	  that	  it	  goes	  on	  in	  the	  same	  way	  ,	  then	  concepts	  are	  a	  lot	  more	  open-­‐ended	  than	  Hector	  has	  led	  us	  to	  believe.	  Indeed,	  it	  would	  seem	  that	  anything	  goes;	  for,	  after	  all,	  given	  world	  enough	  and	  time,	  together	  with	  the	  fact	  that	  those	  who	  know	  how	  to	  undertake	  various	  kinds	  of	  performances	  are	  always	  capable	  of	  forming	  deviant	  or	  mistaken	  beliefs	  about	  what	  goes	  on	  in	  the	  same	  way	  as	  precedent	  performances,	  it	  would	  seem	  that	  any	  concept	  is	  capable	  of	  morphing	  in	  virtually	  unlimited	  ways.	  	  On	  the	  other	  hand,	  the	  idea	  might	  simply	  be	  that	   there	   are	   fixed	   (and	   recognition-­‐independent)	   standards	   for	   “going	   on	   in	   the	  same	   way”	   as	   precedent	   performances,	   and	   that	   satisfying	   these	   standards	  somehow	   guarantees	   that	   people	   who	   know	   how	   to	   undertake	   the	   relevant	  performances	  can	  see	  whether	  the	  standards	  are	  satisfied.	  	  If	  this	  is	  right,	  however,	  then	  every	  concept	  will	  have	  fixed	  boundaries	  after	  all.	  For	  present	  uses	  of	  a	  concept	  count	   as	   such,	   on	   this	   view,	   only	   if	   they	   go	   on	   in	   the	   same	   way	   as	   all	   of	   their	  precedents.	  	  But	  if	  concepts	  have	  fixed	  boundaries,	  then	  they	  start	  to	  look	  like	  fixed,	  pre-­‐determined	  categories	  after	  all.	  	   Finally,	   a	   fifth	   problem:	   	   Consider	   the	   concept	   of	   using	   (or	   applying)	   a	  
concept.	   	   Marion	   and	   Caputo	   have	   a	   concept	   (call	   it	   ‘C1’)	   of	   using	   or	   applying	   a	  concept	   according	   to	   which	   applying	   a	   concept	   to	   God	   is	   idolatrous	   and	   violent.	  	  Hector	  has	  a	  concept	  (call	  it	  ‘C2’)	  of	  using	  or	  applying	  a	  concept	  according	  to	  which	  it	   is	   not	   the	   case	   that	   using	   or	   applying	   a	   concept	   to	  God	   is	   idolatrous	   or	   violent.	  However,	   if	  Hector	   is	   to	  be	   taken	  as	  responding	   to	  Marion	  and	  Caputo	  rather	   than	  simply	  talking	  past	   them,	  C2	  must	  be	   identical	   to	  C1.	  Or,	  at	   the	  very	   least,	   the	  two	  concepts	  must	  overlap	  significantly	  in	  their	  meaning.	  But	  in	  order	  for	  that	  to	  be	  the	  case,	  Hector	  must	  be	  “going	  on	  in	  the	  same	  way”	  as	  Marion	  and	  Caputo;	  and	  it	  is	  not	  not	   immediately	  evident	   that	  he	   is.	  Admittedly,	  neither	   is	   it	  evident	   that	  he	   is	  not.	  	  The	  term	  “going	  on	  in	  the	  same	  way	  as”	  is	  rather	  vague.	  	  He	  is	  clearly	  not	  going	  on	  in	  a	   way	   identical	   to	   that	   in	   which	   Marion	   and	   Caputo	   are	   using	   the	   term.	   But,	   as	  discussed	  in	  note	  6	  above,	  “going	  on	  in	  the	  same	  way”	  in	  fact	  requires	  only	  that	  he	  be	  going	  on	  in	  a	  sufficiently	  similar	  way.	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How	  similar	  is	  sufficient?	  	  It	  is	  hard	  to	  say;	  but	  there	  is	  at	  least	  some	  evidence	  that	  Hector’s	  way	   of	   going	   on	   is	  not	  sufficiently	   similar	   to	  Marion’s	   and	   Caputo’s.	  	  For	   one	   thing,	   we	   know	   that	   his	   concept	   of	   a	   concept	   is	   different	   from	   theirs.	  	  Hector’s	  idea	  concepts,	  elaborated	  so	  thoroughly	  in	  his	  book,	  is	  intended	  as	  a	  rival	  to	  the	  idea	  of	  concepts	  that	  gives	  rise	  to	  the	  idolatry	  and	  violence	  objections.	  	  Insofar	  as	  Hector	   has	   also	   developed	   his	   own	   theory	   of	   concept	   usage	   (also	   intended	   to	  contribute	   to	   defusing	   the	   objections),	   we	   have	   good	   reason	   to	   think	   that	   his	  concept	  of	  using	  	  a	  concept—and	  so	  his	  concept	  of	  applying	  a	  concept—is	  different	  from	  theirs.	  	  If	  that	  is	  right,	  then	  we	  should	  probably	  deny	  that	  Hector	  intends	  to	  go	  on	   in	   the	   same	   (relevantly	   similar)	  way	   as	  Marion	   and	   Caputo.	   	   Indeed,	   it	   seems	  clear	  that	  he	  means	  to	  urge	  all	  of	  us	  to	  go	  on	  in	  a	  relevantly	  different	  way	  from	  them	  in	  our	  own	  usage	  of	  words	  like	   ‘concept’	  and	  ‘apply	  a	  concept’.	   	   If	  I	  am	  right	  about	  this,	   then,	   by	   the	   terms	   of	   his	   own	   theory,	   Hector	   is	   not	   so	   much	   responding	   to	  Marion	  and	  Caputo	  as	  he	  is	  simply	  talking	  past	  them.	  	  	  
4.	  Conclusion	  
	   	  I	   have	   argued	   in	   this	   paper	   that,	   despite	   its	   ingenuity,	   Hector’s	   theory	   of	  concepts	  and	  concept	  application	  is	  not	  adequate	  to	  the	  task	  of	  rescuing	  cataphatic	  theology	   from	   the	   idolatry	   and	   violence	   objections.	   Assuming	   those	   objections	   do	  not	  fail	  for	  other	  reasons,	  the	  dilemma	  thus	  remains:	  apophatic	  theology	  on	  the	  one	  hand,	  or	  idolatrous	  and	  violent	  theology	  on	  the	  other.	  	  	  Despite	  what	   I	  have	  argued	   in	  this	  paper,	  however,	  my	  broader	  sympathies	  do	   lie	  with	  Hector	  and	  other	  cataphatic	   theologians.	   	   I	  agree	  that	   the	  dilemma	  is	  a	  false	   one;	   I	   believe	   that	   cataphatic	   theology	   can	   be	   done	   without	   idolatry	   or	  violence.	   	  This	   is	  not	   the	  place	  to	  develop	  my	  own	  response	  to	   those	  objections	   in	  detail.	  However,	   I	   can	  would	   like	   to	  close	  with	  a	   few	  very	  brief	   remarks	  reporting	  my	  own	  view	  of	  where	  the	  objections	  go	  wrong.	  	  Both	   objections	   turn	   on	   the	   idea	   that	   applying	   concepts	   to	   worldly	  phenomena	   somehow	   distorts	   our	   vision,	   so	   much	   so	   that	   it	   is	   no	   longer	   the	  phenomena	  themselves	  that	  we	  have	  in	  view	  but	  rather	  idols,	  and	  so	  much	  so	  that	  we	  do	  a	  kind	  of	  violence	  to	  the	  phenomena	  by	  reducing	  them	  to	  what	  is	  familiar	  and	  humanly	   graspable,	   and	   by	   privileging	   our	   own	   particular	   perspective	   on	   them,	  rather	   than	  allowing	  them	  to	  appear	  on	  their	  own	  terms	  and	  attending	  to	   them	  in	  ways	   that	  respect	   their	  alterity.8	  	  The	   idea	  seems	   to	  be	   that,	   in	  providing	  what	  we	  take	   to	   be	   an	   objective	   theoretical	   description	   of	   something	   in	   terms	   that	   are	  familiar	  and	  intelligible,	  we	  will	  somehow	  inevitably	  take	  ourselves	  (incorrectly)	  to	  have	   a	   full,	   complete,	   and	   perfectly	   accurate	   grasp	   of	   something	   that	   in	   fact	   can	  never	   be	   fully,	   completely,	   or	   perfectly	   accurately	   grasped;	   or,	   worse,	   we	   will	  inevitably	  make	  it	  the	  case	   that	  the	  thing	  is	  as	  we	  conceive	  of	   it	  rather	  than	  simply	  allowing	  it	  to	  be	  what	  it	  is	  in	  and	  of	  itself.	  	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  8	  On	  the	  privileging	  of	  our	  perspective,	  cf.	  Heidegger	  1999:	  63	  –	  64.	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The	   latter,	   of	   course,	   is	   a	   danger	   only	   if	   the	   anti-­‐realists	   are	   correct	   and	  human	  conceptual	  activity	  plays	  a	  role	  in	  constructing	  the	  world.9	  	  To	  the	  extent	  that	  the	  idolatry	  and	  violence	  objections	  depend	  on	  this	  sort	  of	  anti-­‐realism,	  I	  think	  that	  that	   is	  where	  they	  go	  wrong.	   	  The	  answer,	   then,	   is	  not	   to	  reconceive	   the	  nature	  of	  human	  concepts	  and	  human	  concept	  application	  as	  Hector	  tries	  to	  do,	  but	  rather	  to	  reject	  the	  underlying	  picture	  of	  how	  concepts	  relate	  to	  objects	  and	  their	  properties.	  	  	  As	   to	   the	   former—the	   idea	   that	   concept	   application	   somehow	  presupposes	  that	   our	   grasp	   of	  worldly	   phenomena	   is	  more	   complete	   and	   accurate	   than	   it	   ever	  could	   be—I	   think	   that	   the	   answer	   is	   again	   not	   to	   reconceive	   the	   very	   nature	   of	  human	  conceptualization	  but	  rather	  to	  cultivate	  an	  appreciation	  for	  the	  richness	  of	  the	   properties	   to	  which	  many	   of	   our	   concepts	   refer.	   	   Heidegger	   says	   (with	  many	  others	  in	  his	  wake)	  that	  “the	  difficulty	  lies	  in	  language”.	  (2002:	  73)	  My	  own	  view,	  on	  the	  other	  hand,	  is	  that	  such	  problems	  as	  there	  are	  in	  this	  neighborhood	  lie	  more	  in	  our	  own	  contingent	  attitudes	   toward	  the	  objects	  about	  which	  we	  theorize	  and	  the	  things	  that	  we	  say	  about	  those	  objects.	  	  To	  say	  that	  God	  is	  wise,	  for	  example,	  is	  (as	  I	  see	  it)	  to	  say	  no	  more	  or	  less	  than	  that	  God	  has	  a	  certain	  rather	  familiar	  property—
wisdom—a	   property	   also	   had	   by	   many	   human	   beings.	   In	   saying	   this,	   we	   might	  presume	  many	  further	  things:	   	   that	  wisdom	  is	  a	  universal,	  God	   is	  a	  particular,	  and	  God	   exemplifies	   wisdom;	   that	   divine	   wisdom	   has	   exactly	   the	   same	   qualitative	  character	   as	   human	   wisdom;	   that	   our	   grasp	   of	   wisdom	   as	   we	   experience	   it	   in	  humans	  is	  so	  thorough	  as	  to	  allow	  us	  to	  deduce	  many	  other	  things	  about	  God	  from	  the	  simple	  thesis	  that	  God	  is	  wise;	  that	  wisdom	  is	  part	  of	  God’s	  essence,	  and	  that	  in	  grasping	  wisdom	  (and	  maybe	  a	  few	  other	  familiar	  properties)	  we	  have	  a	  thorough	  and	  secure	  understanding	  of	  the	  totality	  of	  the	  divine	  essence,	  and	  so	  on.	  	  We	  might	  presume	  these	  things,	  but	  we	  need	  not	  do	  so.	  	  All	  of	  these	  claims	  and	  more	  are	  up	  for	  grabs	   as	  we	   theorize	   further	   about	  what	  we	  mean	  when	  we	   say	   that	  God	   is	  wise,	  about	  the	  extent	  to	  which	  that	  claim	  can	  be	  thought	  of	  as	  literal	  or	  metaphorical,	  and	  so	   on.	   Divine	   wisdom	   must	   bear	   some	   intelligible	   relation	   to	   human	   wisdom	   in	  order	   for	   the	  predication	  to	  be	  apt;	  but	  we	  might	  well	  be	   ignorant	  of	  exactly	  what	  that	  relation	  amounts	  to.	   	  So	  long	  as	  we	  steadfastly	  maintain	  this	  understanding	  of	  the	  limits	  on	  what	  it	  means	  to	  say	  things	  like	  ‘God	  is	  wise’,	  it	  is	  hard	  to	  see	  how	  the	  idolatry	  and	  violence	  objections	  can	  have	  any	  real	  purchase.	  	  So,	  in	  the	  end,	  I	  think	  that	  we	  can	  have	  theology	  without	  idolatry	  or	  violence.	   	  My	  difference	  with	  Hector	  simply	  concerns	  the	  reason	  why.	  
	   	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  9	  It	  is	  perhaps	  worth	  noting	  that	  Heidegger,	  at	  any	  rate,	  seems	  to	  reject	  this	  brand	  of	  anti-­‐realism.	  (1999:	  63)	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